Michael tried to make the distinction between a "belief" and a "value." He described a belief as a statement in your mind that you hold with some degree of certainty (e.g., socialism is less productive than capitalism) versus a value which is a statement of how things ought to be (e.g., society should defend pluralism). He confused these things as separate sets, when in fact values are just a subset of beliefs; values are normative beliefs.
Why bother pointing this out? Because "values" should be treated no differently than "beliefs." All beliefs are subject to revision in the face of new data or deeper reasoning. Values should be treated exactly the same way. For instance, the value of miscegenation (i.e., keeping races separated is better for society) has been revised in the last century. The danger of making values any different than standard beliefs is that people will go to greater lengths to uphold it despite evidence of harm or inconsistency (e.g., apartheid). Ideally people could change their values as prudently and dispassionately as they would any other belief; for instance deciding that a market for donated organs is not repugnant, just as the same way as you come to decide that Google is overvalued.
David tried to swerve us away from the dusty philosophic chatter, when he talked about the experience of being wrong, and the importance of forgiving yourself. This brings an interesting classification of being wrong: errors of reasoning vs "human weakness." It strikes me that reasoning errors don't create the type of internal guilt that would require forgiveness. For example, if I conclude that political donations aren't a good business investment after ten years of donating, I might wish I had the money back, but you live and learn. On the other hand, if I gambled away the kids' education fund on a trip to Vegas, despite knowing the odds but hoping for a short-cut gain and a thrill along the way, then I should be guilty.
This brings me back to planning. The most interesting moral problems to are defined by choosing a smaller, more-certain, short-term gain without regard to longer-term repercussions. In fact, I think the essence of morality is defined by an acceptable duration to an event horizon. This duration could be a week, a year, or three generations. Depending on this duration, some actions could be judged both moral and immoral.
Think of every plan or action as having a short and long-term expected impact. For example consider two projects.
1. Gamble-education-fund-project
Short-term impact:
- Thrill: likelihood 99%
- Profit likelihood: 5%
- Breakeven likelihood: 20%
- Some loss likelihood: 50%
- Wipeout likelihood: 25%
Long-term impact:
- If profit, use profits to take a vacation in next year
- If some loss, work harder to make up the difference for next five years
- If wipeout, fail to provide kids education in 15 years
2. Pursue-masters-in-computer-science-project
Short-term impact:
- Loss of income for two years
- Loss of capital for tuition
Long-term impact:
- Better earnings potential, expected breakeven in five years
- More fulfilling career, greater prestige, greater flexiblity in ten years
Now consider two event horizons: three months vs thirty years. Clearly if you take the thirty-year's view, the gambling project is immoral. If you take the three-months view (e.g., terminal disease, last chance for fun), the gambling project doesn't sound so bad.
Extending this idea one step further, as human societies mature, the event horizon is pushed out further and further. In cave men times, morality might have been defined by an event horizon of a week. In medieval times, society thought in terms of years. In modern times, we think in terms of a generation. Perhaps the evolution of morality is the gradual increase in the duration to the event horizon.
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Philosophy is like weight training; it's necessary to master for any sport, but is not itself an Olympic sport. The Olympic sports are science, ethics, political economy, business admin and management, and engineering.
